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In his seminal work on ﬁscal federalism, Oates (1972) addressed the so-
called Decentralization Theorem, which states that, if such factors as scale
economies and spillovers are left out of consideration, a decentralized sys-
tem is always more eﬃcient than a centralized system for the supply of local
public goods. Based on his analytical framework, we contrarily show that
a centralized system is at times more eﬃcient than a decentralized system
under a democratic decision rule (Proposition 2). The key to such a possibil-
ity is the interests of minorities that may be sacriﬁced in each lower district
under decentralization. That is, when the majority adopts an extreme policy
that is far from minorities’ tastes in a lower district under decentralization,
if instead a moderate policy which is closer to minorities’ tastes were chosen
under centralization, then the interests of minorities would be saved. As a
result, centralization could attain higher social welfare than decentralization.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D62, H42, L32
Key words: centralization, decentralization, local public goods and services,
majority rule, interests of minorities1 Introduction
In this paper, we construct a model of two-tier districts with intra- and
inter-district heterogeneity and examine comparative eﬃciency between cen-
tralized and decentralized systems under a majority rule. Special attention
is paid on the interests of minorities in each lower district, which may be
ignored under decentralization but taken into account to some extent under
centralization.
Comparative eﬃciency between centralized and decentralized systems has
long been examined in the literature of ﬁscal federalism. Conventionally,
goods and services supplied by a public enterprise are assumed uniform in
the constituency. In particular, it is assumed that residents in diﬀerent local
districts are provided with the same level of local public goods by the central
government. 1 Based on such uniformity assumption and benevolent gov-
ernments, Oates (1972) addressed the well-known Decentralization Theorem,
which states that local governments, which respectively choose the amount of
public goods for their jurisdictions, are always more eﬃcient than the central
government, which provides a uniform amount of public goods to all local
jurisdictions.
The study of ﬁscal federalism after the Decentralization Theorem has
been developed by adding to the model some extra factors that are bal-
anced with the eﬀects of uniformity. For example, Oates (1972) himself
1A critique of the uniformity assumption claims that the level of local public goods
need not be uniform across local constituencies under centralization [e.g. Besley and
Coate (1999)]. In some occasions, however, uniformity assumption seems quite reasonable
to make. First, in reality, many public services are supplied uniformly across local con-
stituencies by the central government because of limited information on individual tastes,
abilities and physical constitutions, of administrative costs, and of the ethics of equality.
Examples in some European nations and Japan include primary and secondary education,
immunization for children, and basic sanitation programs, although the kinds and intensity
of schooling or medical care may diﬀer across children living in distinct local communities.
Second, in a sense, it is theoretically biased to assume that the central government can
supply diﬀerent levels of local public goods to the residents living in diﬀerent places in its
district, but that a local government cannot do the same thing.
1introduced into his model scale economies in the provision of local public
goods. He also examined a tradeoﬀ between uniformity under centralization
and spillovers of the beneﬁt from local public goods. Other sorts of tradeoﬀs
include scale economies under centralization against district-tailored supply
of public goods under decentralization [Alesina and Spoalare (1997)], exoge-
neously given beneﬁt of centralization against an income tax schedule which
is appropriately chosen according to the income inequality of the local dis-
trict under decentralization [Bolton and Roland (1997)], internalization of
spillovers under centralization against the interests of small districts which
are saved under decentralization [Ellingsen (1998)], and internalization of
spillovers under centralization against adaptation to heterogeneous tastes for
public goods by decentralization [Besley and Coate (1999)].
Contrary to such trend of extension of the model, this paper retains the
original setting of Oates with the uniformity assumption, leaving out of con-
sideration such factors as scale economies, spillovers, and any other exoge-
neously given beneﬁt from centralization. We rather consider an implication
of democracy in collective decision making to the eﬃciency of centralized
and decentralized systems. We ﬁnd from the study that, despite the Decen-
tralization Theorem, centralized system, which applies a uniform intensity
level to all lower districts, is at times more eﬃcient than a decentralized
system, which can apply distinct intensity levels to diﬀerent lower districts
(Proposition 2).
The intuitive logic behind this result is as follows. In a lower district, the
interests of minorities may be ignored under a majority rule. 2 In particular,
when there is wide divergence of tastes for public services among residents in
a lower district, an extreme policy can be chosen in it which is best preferred
2In the model of local public goods with inter-regional spillovers, Ellingsen (1998)
pointed out this aspect on a inter-regional basis; when two districts form an upper district,
the interests of the smaller district will be ignored under a majority rule. This paper
considers the problem of neglected interests of minorities on a intra-regional basis, where
the tastes for a public service vary within a lower district.
2by the majority but not desired by the minority. In some cases, eﬃciency
loss caused by the ignored interests of the minority could be considerably
large. As the law of large numbers suggests, extreme policies taken in each
lower district may be leveled down and up if these small districts are inte-
grated into a large district. When indeed a moderate policy is chosen under
centralization, the interests of the minority will be saved to some extent with-
out terribly harming the interests of the majority, and as a result the social
welfare may be improved.
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows. The next section
presents a model of two-tier governments which supply a local public service.
Section 3 qualitatively examines comparative eﬃciency between centralized
and decentralized systems, while section 4 tackles the problem quantitatively.
Section 5 concludes the paper with the discussion on the implications of our
theory to the reality.
2 The model
Assume that there are two levels of districts: m lower districts (e.g. states,
provinces, prefectures/cities, towns) constitute a higher district (e.g. a na-
tion/a state, province, prefecture). There are ni residents in lower district
i =1 ,...,m, so that there are

i ni residents in the higher district. We ex-
clude the possibility that the residents move across the border of the lower
districts.
Let x be the intensity of a public service, and c(x) be its cost per capita.
We assume that c(0) = 0, c (0) = 0, c (x) > 0 for x>0, and c  (x) > 0. 3
The total cost for the public service, which is c(x) multiplied by the number
of residents in the district, is assumed to be ﬁnanced by a poll tax. Hence,
each resident pays c(x). The intensity x is assumed uniform to all residents
in the district with which the government is charged. Therefore, x is uniform
3Single primes indicate ﬁrst derivatives, and double primes indicate second derivatives.
3only within a lower district under decentralization, but it is uniform in all
lower districts under centralization.
We assume that individuals have a quasi-linear utility function (so that
we can ignore the eﬀects of the initial wealth). The utility function of an
individual is thus written as
u = bx − c(x)
where b ≥ 0 is his taste parameter for the public service. He then best prefers
the intensity x with
b = c
 (x). (1)
Since c   > 0, (1) yields the demand function for the intensity of the public
service, x =˜ x(b), where ˜ x := (c )−1. Notice that ˜ x (b) > 0; i.e., residents
with greater b prefer a more intensive service.
In this model, comparative eﬃciency between centralized and decentral-
ized systems rests solely on the distribution of taste parameter b in each lower
district, gi(b), and its distribution in the higher district, g(b).
3 A qualitative analysis
In this section, we assume that there are two types of residents in each lower
district. In lower district i =1 ,...,m, nH
i residents value the public service
high at b = bH
i , and nL
i residents value it low at b = bL





i . (Therefore, gi(b)=nH
i /ni if b = bH
i , gi(b)=nL
i /ni if b = bL
i ,
and gi(b) = 0 otherwise.) Let xH
i := ˜ x(bH
i ) and xL
i := ˜ x(bL
i ).
Let xi denote the intensity of the public service selected in lower district
i. For two lower districts i and j, xi must equal xj under centralization,
and xi can diﬀer from xj under decentralization. The sum of utility of the
















i xi − c(xi)

.
4The social welfare, which is the sum of utility of all residents in the higher dis-
trict, is then given by

i Ui(xi). Maximizing the social welfare with respect
to (x1,...,xm), the social optimum is characterized by
bi = c
 (xi) i =1 ,...,m (2)




i . Let xi := ˜ x(bi). That is, (x1,...,xn)
constitute the social optimum intensity levels.
Let ˆ bi be the taste parameter of the median voter in lower district i.
Then, ˆ xi := x(ˆ bi) is chosen by the simple majority rule in lower district i
under decentralization. Notice that ˆ xi = xH
i > xi (oversupply) if nH
i >n L
i ,
and ˆ xi = xL
i < xi (undersupply) if nL
i >n H
i . Similarly, let ˆ b be the taste
parameter of the median voter in the higher district. Then, ˆ x := x(ˆ b)i s
chosen by the simple majority rule under centralization.
In general, social optimum is not attained by a majority rule. We will thus
examine relative eﬃciency between centralized and decentralized systems by
comparing





Ifˆ bi ≤ ˆ b ≤ bi or bi ≤ ˆ b ≤ ˆ bi, then Ui(ˆ x) ≥ Ui(ˆ xi). Conversely, if ˆ b ≤ ˆ bi ≤ bi
or bi ≤ ˆ bi ≤ ˆ b, then Ui(ˆ xi) ≥ Ui(ˆ x).
Proof:
Since c   > 0, Ui is strictly concave with respect to xi with its peak at









i). By replacing x1
i and x2
i with ˆ x and ˆ xi accordingly
and using ˜ x (b) > 0, we obtain the property.  









j for i  = j, then it does not matter which of the
central government or local governments supplies the public service, as far
as economic eﬃciency is concerned.
5Proposition 1 [Oates (1972)]:
Suppose that bH
i = bL
i = bi for all i =1 ,...,m. Then, decentralization is




i = bi, ˆ bi = bi = bi for all i =1 ,...,m. Therefore, decentral-
ization attains the social optimum. Under centralization, on the other hand,
since ˆ b = bj for some j, ˆ b = bj = ˆ bj so that ˆ b is optimal for lower district j.
However, unless bi = bj for all i  = j, it holds that ˆ b = bj  = bi = ˆ bi for some
i  = j, so that ˆ b is not optimal for lower district i. Therefore, centralization
does not attain the social optimum unless bi = bj for all i,j =1 ,...,m.  
The condition bH
i = bL
i = bi for all i =1 ,...,m in Proposition 1 implies
that there is no intra-district heterogeneity in each lower district. Indeed,
inter-district heterogeneity (bi  = bj for some i  = j) is the cause of superiority






i for all i =
1,...,m and ˆ b = min{bH
1 ,...,bH
m}, then centralization is more eﬃcient than,
or at least as eﬃcient as, decentralization.
Proof:






ˆ b ≥ bi i =1 ,...,m. (3)
Next, since nH
i >n L
i , we have ˆ bi = bH
i for all i. Also, since ˆ b ≤ bH
i for all i
by assumption, it holds that
ˆ b ≤ ˆ bi i =1 ,...,m. (4)
By (3) and (4), we have bi ≤ ˆ b ≤ ˆ bi for all i. Then, by Property 1, we have
6Ui(ˆ x) ≥ Ui(ˆ xi) for all i =1 ,...,m, so that the social welfare is no less under
centralization than under decentralization.  
There are intra-district heterogeneity in the case of Proposition 2, which
may cause superiority of centralization over decentralization. Existence of
minorities, which is represented by nL
i > 0 in this case, is cruicial for this
result. Seeing bi as a function of nL
i , the conditions of the proposition require
that bi(nL
i ) ≤ β for some β := min{bH
1 ,...,bH





i , and b
 
i(nL
i ) < 0. Therefore, as long as nH
i >n L
i , the
greater the volume of the minority nL
i is, the more likely the requirement is






i for all i =
1,...,m and ˆ b = max{bL
1,...,bL
m}, then centralization is more eﬃcient than,
or at least as eﬃcient as, decentralization.
Proof:
The proof is symmetrical to that of Proposition 2, and is omitted.  
Notice that Proposition 2 (as well as Corollary 1) provides a set of suf-
ﬁcient conditions with which centralization is more desirable than decen-
tralization. Slight divergence from the conditions is still likely to retain the
result. For example, when ˆ b equals either of the ﬁrst few minimum elements
in {bH
1 ,...,bH
m}, it holds that Uj(ˆ x) <U j(ˆ xj) for a few lower districts j but
Uk(ˆ x) >U k(ˆ xk) for all the other lower districts k. Therefore, it is still quite
possible that

i Ui(ˆ x) >

i Ui(ˆ xi) holds.
74 A quantitative analysis
This section presents a numerical example with two lower districts of equal
size which have symmetrically diﬀerent distribution of the preference for the
public service.
We ﬁrst specify the distribution of the taste parameter b. Let f(b;p)
be a binominal density, where b ∈{ 0,1,2,...,10} is a random variable and
p ∈ (0,1) is the parameter of the density function. 4 Let
g1(b): =wf(b;p)+( 1− w)f(b;1− p)
and
g2(b): =( 1− w)f(b;p)+wf(b;1− p)
where w ∈ [0,1] is the weight for the two symmetric density functions, f(b;p)
and f(b;1−p). The density function g1 is illustrated in Figure 1 for w =0 .3
and various values of p. 5 We assume that b is distributed according to g1
and g2 in lower districts 1 and 2, respectively. Since the two lower districts
are assumed to have an equal population size, the distribution of b in the








In what follows, since g1 and g2 are symmetric to each other, it suﬃces to
pay our attention to the region of (p,w) with 0 <p≤ 0.5 and 0 ≤ w ≤ 0.5.
For the economic context, p implies divergence of residents’ preferences
for the public service in a lower district. The divergence is wide when p is
close to 0 (the two hills are remote to each other), whereas it is narrow when
4We exclude the case of p = 0 and p = 1 in the simulation, in which the votes for
˜ x(b = 0) and ˜ x(b = 10) tie under centralization.
5g1 and g2 may or may not have two hills, according to the values of p and w. When
they have two hills, p determines the horizontal diﬀerence between the two peaks (which
is wide when p is close to 0 or 1, and narrow when it is close to 0.5), and w determines
the vertical diﬀerence between them (which is wide when w is close to 0 or 1, and narrow
when it is close to 0.5).
8p is close to 0.5 (the two hills are close to each other, or they merge into one
hill). In this sense, p indicates the degree of intra-district heterogeneity of
residents’ preferences in a lower district.
On the other hand, w shows how diﬀerent the two lower districts are. The
two districts are very diﬀerent when w is close to 0, whereas they are exactly
the same when w =0 .5. In this sense, w implies the degree of inter-district
heterogeneity of residents’ preferences. At the same time, w also determines
the relative importance of minorities in each lower district. Minorities are
negligible when w is close to 0 (the smaller hill is very short), whereas they
are signiﬁcant when w is close to 0.5 (the smaller hill is almost as tall as the
larger hill).
Specifying the cost function as c(x)=x2/2, we can calculate an equi-
librium intensity level under centralization and decentralization for given
(p,w). By substituting the intensity level so derived back into individual
utility functions and adding them up, we obtain the social welfare under the
two regimes. We can then determine which of centralized and decentralized
systems is more eﬃcient than the other for that (p,w). Such results are
summarized in Figure 2.
When p ≈ 0 and w ≈ 0.5, intra-district heterogeneity is wide and minori-
ties are numerous. As Proposition 2 suggests, centralization works better
than decentralization in this case, since the former better saves the interests
of minorities in each lower district. Indeed, in Figure 2, centralization sur-
passes decentralization in eﬃciency at such points as (p,w)=( 0 .1,0.4) and
(p,w)=( 0 .1,0.3). As p approaches 0.5, intra-district heterogeneity shrinks,
and the beneﬁt of minorities from centralization diminishes. For example,
at (p,w)=( 0 .1,0.3), if p increases from 0.1t o0 .2 with w being kept at 0.3,
decentralization comes to surpass centralization. On the other hand, as w
approaches 0, minorities get fewer, and again the beneﬁt of minorities from
centralization diminishes. At (p,w)=( 0 .1,0.3), for example, if w decreases
from 0.3t o0 .2 with p being kept at 0.1, decentralization comes to surpass
9centralization.
An opposite argument holds when p ≈ 0.5 and w ≈ 0. In that case,
intra-district heterogeneity is narrow and minorities are few. Therefore, as
Proposition 1 suggests, decentralization works better than centralization,
since the losses of minorities’ interests from decentralization are limited. In
Figure 2, decentralization works better than centralization at such points
as (p,w)=( 0 .4,0.1), (p,w)=( 0 .3,0.2), and (p,w)=( 0 .2,0.3). As p ap-
proaches 0, intra-district heterogeneity widens, and the losses of minorities’
interests from decentralization increase. At (p,w)=( 0 .2,0.3), if p decreases
from 0.2t o0 .1 with w being kept at 0.3, centralization comes to surpass de-
centralization. On the other hand, as w approaches 0.5, minorities get more
numerous, and again the losses of minorities’ interests from decentralization
increase. At (p,w)=( 0 .2,0.3), if w increases from 0.3t o0 .4 with p being
kept at 0.2, centralization comes to surpass decentralization.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined comparative eﬃciency between centralized and
decentralized systems in a conventional model of ﬁscal federalism under
democracy, where the provision of local public goods and services is re-
stricted to be uniformly across lower districts under centralization. Without
incorporating into the model such additional factors as scale economies and
spillovers, we obtained a result which is contrary to Oates’ (1972) Decentral-
ization Theorem; i.e., centralization is at times more eﬃcient than decentral-
ization. The key to this result is the existence of minorities whose interests
may be sacriﬁced under a majority rule in a local constituency. Suppose that
an extreme policy that is preferred by the majority prevails in a lower district
and the interests of the minority are being ignored under decentralization.
If the system were centralized and a milder policy were chosen, the welfare
of the minority would improve. As a result, a higher level of social welfare
10could be attained under centralization than under decentralization.
In the rest of this section, we discuss some implications of our theoretical
results to the reality.
Diﬀerence in age structure between urban and rural areas
The age structure often diﬀers between urban and rural areas. Typically,
upon graduation from high school or college, young people move from rural
to urban areas for higher education or jobs. Then, they return to their
hometown after retirement. By this reason or the other, urban areas are
relatively thickly populated with working age people, whereas rural areas are
with old people. Consequently, the interests of old people in urban areas,
and those of young and middle-aged people in rural areas, may not be well
reﬂected in the decision of local public expenditure. For example, welfare
programs for the aged might be undersupplied in urban areas but rather
oversupplied in rural areas under decentralization. If a moderate level of
the programs (which is more intensive than those in urban areas but less
intensive than those in rural areas under decentralization) were chosen under
centralization, then the interests of the old in urban areas, and those of the
young and middle-aged in rural areas, would be saved. Thus, a higher level
of social welfare might be attained under a centralized than a decentralized
system.
Diﬀerence in wealth level among adjacent local districts
We commonly observe that people of a similar income level reside in the
same area and dominate the community. Upper East Side of Manhattan in
New York, Hampstead in London, and Denen Chofu in Tokyo are well-known
sites for wealthy residents. Indeed, it is not unusual that the preferences for
public goods and services well diﬀer among adjacent local districts. For
example, municipal bus transportation, playgrounds and public halls may be
undersupplied in districts where high-income households hold the majority,
11but oversupplied in districts where low-income households hold the majority.
The society as a whole thus sacriﬁces the interests of low-income households
(who need more of those goods and services) in the former districts and
the interests of high-income households (who in fact do not need much of
those goods and services) in the latter districts. 6 If the decision were
made at a higher level of district that encompasses these lower districts, then
a moderate amount of the goods and services would be selected and the
interests of minorities could be saved. As the result, the society might attain
a higher level of welfare by centralizing the system.
Diﬀerence in enthusiasm for environmental protection among countries
Our theory may be applied not only to local problems as discussed in
the previous two subsections, but also to international aﬀairs such as global
environmental protection programs. As for the emission of carbon dioxide
which causes global warming eﬀects, for example, Europe is determined, and
the United States is passive. If the decisions are made separately, a very
strict emission standard will be enforced in EU whereas a loose standard
will be applied in the US. This may harm the interests of EU industrialists
and US environmentalists. With the coordination by the United Nations, a
moderate standard would be adopted and the interests of minorities in both
areas would be saved. Consequently, the outcome might be more eﬃcient
under UN coordination than under separate decisions.
6On the contrary, cultural facilities such as museums and music halls may be oversup-
plied in the former type of districts, sacriﬁcing the low-income households, and undersup-
plied in the latter type of districts, sacriﬁcing the high-income households.
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